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Abstract 
This paper addresses “ecosystem health”, a concept recently popularised as the way forward in evaluating nature. The 
concept is often defined in vague expressions and is being seen more as a broad societal aspiration rather than a specific 
performance measure of ecosystem management. As such, the paper aims to demystify ecosystem health, that is, to 
demarcate an accurate and feasible characterisation of the concept. To achieve this aim an examination of the various 
viewpoints of nature is undertaken. Models of ecosystem health, such as the notions of naturalness, genetic fitness, climax, 
diversity, stability and keystone species are each considered and subsequently deemed inappropriate, especially when 
viewing ecosystems as “complex self-organising systems”. Complex self-organising systems are non-linear dynamic 
systems that have multiple steady states and have emergent and chaotic properties. One model that captures this self-
organisation process is Holling’s adaptive cycle. However, when investigating this model it was concluded that there is no 
means to determining which phase within a system state, or state within a system is ecologically “better”. Therefore, 
ecosystem health cannot be considered in a positive manner established by scientific objectivity. Rather, the concept must 
be determined in a normative fashion through it is suggested the elicitation of subjective societal values, so to define an 
optimal management strategy. But, implementing such a strategy is difficult because the changing nature and 
unpredictability of complex self-organising systems means we cannot focus on “locking-in” ecosystems (or preferences), 
instead it is argued we must forever adapt to changing ecological conditions.   
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1.0 Introduction  
Ecosystem health, a concept first generally enunciated by the pioneering ecologist Aldo Leopold in 1939 as a 
means to elucidating the condition of ecosystems, is today being hailed as the way forward in evaluating 
nature and its management for conservation and resource use purposes. This interest in the concept of 
ecosystem health has been brought about, in part, because the management of ecosystems captures a broader, 
all-encompassing perspective of nature (Angermeier & Karr, 1994), which is likely to take advantage of 
associated gains in economies of scale and efficiency (Simberloff, 1997). Moreover, the popularity of 
ecosystem health also stems from an easy comprehension of the concept, as it fundamentally draws on the 
expressions developed in human health and makes that seemingly effortless and intuitive step to integrate 
these notions with ecological theory (Rapport, 1989; Costanza, 1992). Thus, one might say that ecosystem 
health effectively applies the human health metaphor to ecosystems (Schaeffer et al., 1988). But, what makes 
the concept of ecosystem health so appealing is that while it focuses on ecosystems as its unit of measurement, 
and thus can encapsulate an ecocentric perspective, it not only draws upon human health as an analogy, but 
also encompasses human (societal) health as well. Indeed, even though well removed and hidden from many 
actors of society, a healthy ecosystem in economic terms provides the necessary “factors of production” 
needed for human health and basic life-support required for development (Folke, 1999). Consequently, at the 
root of ecosystem health, is the ideals of co-evolutionary development (Norgaard, 1984; 1994); that is, the 
conditions necessary to sustain the capacity of an ecosystem are very much dependent on society, and yet in 
turn, society is dependant on these very ecosystems for their own health and development (Costanza, 1992; 
Odum, 1993; Ferraro & Simpson, 2002).  
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Nonetheless, despite the popularity of the term ecosystem health, the concept still remains poorly understood 
which has resulted in it being defined, at best, utilising rather vague expressions (O’Laughlin et al., 1994). In 
contrast, while human health has a wide body of reference data on the so-called “standard human” (Schaeffer 
et al., 1988), advocates of ecosystem health have much less agreement in demarcating a benchmark or apt 
endpoint. However, difficulty in demarcating ecosystem health in precise language is not surprising. The 
inherently intricate nature of ecosystems coupled with certain philosophical misgivings, such as, whether 
anyone has ever seen an ecosystem, and is health a relevant expression when applied to a system, have 
plagued progress towards a suitable working definition (Calow, 1992; Costanza, 1992; Callicott, 1995; Meyer, 
1997; Kapustka & Landis, 1998; Rapport et al., 1998; Callicott et al., 1999; Karr, 1999). What is more, the 
literature is besieged with confusion as to whether ecosystem health and ecosystem integrity are one and the 
same thing or not (e.g. Karr, 1996). Thus, with these reservations, simply seeking to achieve a “healthy 
ecosystem” provides no more direction to the ecosystem manager, than seeking a “strong economy” does for 
the economist (Reid, 1994).  
 
These difficulties in defining ecosystem health have unfortunately stalled the complete endorsement of the 
concept (Steedman, 1994; Scrimgeour & Wicklum, 1996; De Leo & Levin, 1997; Gaudet et al., 1997; Lancaster, 
2000). As such, the importance of ecosystem health has been marginalised, whereby it is being portrayed 
more and more as a broad societal aspiration than a specific measure of ecosystem management. Thus, if 
ecosystem health is to be used as a means to examine the performance of ecosystems, then coherent, clear and 
quantifiable definitions must be crafted so that the concept can be delineated operational. That aim is what 
this paper endeavours to achieve, that is to say, to demystify ecosystem health, to demarcate an accurate and 
feasible characterisation of what a healthy ecosystem is deemed to be. In other words, what we are attempting 
is to delineate the appropriate performance criteria for determining the “success” of ecosystem management. 
In order to achieve this aim an exhaustive examination of the various viewpoints of nature is undertaken.  
 
2.0 The arcadian naturalness model 
One viewpoint of the nature of ecosystems is the arcadian school, which promotes the characterisation of 
ecosystems through notions of natural aesthetics and ethics towards species (Worster, 1979). Consequently, 
this school of thought proposes that the health of an ecosystem is determined by its degree of natural integrity 
(Schaeffer et al., 1988; Anderson, 1991; Angermeier & Karr, 1994; Wicklum & Davies, 1995). A high degree of 
natural integrity is considered an ecosystem which displays considerable “naturalness”, that is succinctly, an 
ecosystem that is unimpaired from human action and on all accounts would be considered pristine (Karr & 
Chu, 1999). Consequently, this so-called naturalness model of ecosystem health implicitly infers that 
ecosystems that are unaltered by human activity are “healthier” than human-altered systems and that 
ecosystem health can be described solely through the maintenance of a natural assemblage of species.  
 
There are a number of examples of the naturalness model that have been proposed or utilised for the 
evaluation of ecosystem health. One, pioneering example is that given by Leopold (1941) who claimed that 
“wilderness” should be considered the best “base-datum of normality”. Another more developed framework 
is the Index of Biological Integrity (IBI) (Karr, 1981; Karr et al., 1986). This simple index develops a scale of 
health, whereby an ecosystem, which is the product of evolutionary processes in the absence of modern 
human activity, is considered the index’s optimum. More recently, Stephens et al. (2002) developed a 
sophisticated framework to evaluate health of ecosystems by formally integrating naturalness, described as 
natural character, with a priority setting function reflecting the significance of the ecosystem for nature 
heritage and conservation purposes (see Equation 1).  
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Equation 1: Nature heritage framework (Source: Adapted from Stephens et al., 2002). 
Where NH is the nature heritage index of ecosystem i 
∆NCi is the change in natural character of ecosystem i after ecosystem management 
 Priority setting function: DISi is the distinctiveness of the ecosystem i  
IMPi is the importance of ecosystem i  
SIZEi is the size of ecosystem i 
 
Importantly, though rarely stated explicitly in the literature, the premise of the naturalness model is the 
ideology of environmental therapeutic nihilism, in that “nature knows best” and is subsequently “good” in 
itself (Commoner, 1971). As such, the naturalness model enshrines a dichotomy between humans and nature, 
a metaphysical separation between the “vices” of humans from the “virtues” of nature. Therefore, this 
ideology rejects that society is “in charge” of nature. The implications of this premise is that while systems 
altered by humans, may be desirable for strictly utilitarian reasons, they cannot provide a truly objective 
ecocentric point of reference for assessing ecosystem health (Angermeier & Karr, 1994).  
 
The exact objective point of reference presumed by the naturalness model has nonetheless been questioned, 
not least because the very act of delineating what is the natural state of an ecosystem must be concluded as an 
implicit subjective preference (Lele & Norgaard, 1996). For example, in the case of New Zealand (or 
Australia), is naturalness calculated from the time of initial human arrival or at the time of European arrival?  
The selection as to which of these two reference points is the most appropriate according to the naturalness 
model is ultimately a subjective value judgement (Wassenaar & Ferreira, 2002). Indeed, even if a pre-human 
or a pre-European state could be universally agreed upon as a definition of what naturalness really is, there 
still remains the problem that in either case, our understanding of what pre-European ecosystems let alone a 
pre-human ecosystems once looked like is poorly known (Caughley, 1989; Pimm, 1991). As such, most 
attempts to implement the naturalness model are based on the earliest recorded form, which is for all intent 
and purposes well after European colonisation (Hannon, 1992), and even then most ecosystems can only be 
characterised by some components of macro-vegetation (McGlone, 1983; 1989).  
 
For argument sake let us suppose that sufficient information could be gathered necessary to recreate the 
composition of an historic ecosystem. We are still however left with a number of issues that inhibit the 
practicality of the naturalness model. Not least of these difficulties, is that the concept of naturalness signifies 
the modelling of an ecosystem from a “snapshot” perspective, which neglects changes from “natural” 
perturbations that undoubtedly occur. Furthermore, utilising a naturalness reference point characterises an 
ecosystem as a eternally static system, whereby all human perturbations and other stresses outside a natural 
range represent a decrease in health is similarly not accounting for the fact that ecosystems evolve over time. 
Thus, because ecosystems are dynamic systems, even if the species are not extinct, ecosystem managers in 
practice would never be able to attain the “correct” assembly of species for any reasonable length of time.  
 
A further deficiency with the naturalness model is that it only can define an ecosystem as a biotic structural 
assemblage of species, which seemingly ignores the functionality of an ecosystem in favour of aesthetic 
appearance alone (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1992; Thompson, 2000). Ecosystem functionality however, is important 
because it models and encapsulates the nature of an ecosystem truly as a system, consisting of networks, 
connections, mechanisms, flows and fluxes (Odum, 1969; O’Neill et al., 1986). Interestingly, some researchers 
suggest that the monitoring of ecosystem structure and composition will adequately encapsulate ecosystem 
functioning because functional components will most probably be maintained if the structural assembly is 
adequately preserved (Ferriera & Towns, 2001). To date, however, this assumption has no conclusive 
empirical evidence in which to support its claims.  
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Given the lack of scientific evidence in support of the notion that an ecosystem’s structural assemblage begets 
its function, most restoration efforts of ecosystems have opted to avoid the attainment of a “natural” 
assemblage of species. Instead, because functionality may well be more significant to the health of an 
ecosystem, restoration programmes have often adopted functionality as the sole measure of ecosystem health. 
Accordingly, restoration is then considered a “success” when ecological functioning is restored to “natural” 
levels (Hobbs & Norton, 1996). Such a means to evaluating ecosystem functioning has been developed, in 
which the measures utilise a number of vital ecosystem parameters of functionality (e.g. nutrient cycling and 
retention) (e.g. Swanson et al., 1993; Caraher & Knapp, 1995; Walker & Boyer, 1995) (see Figure 1).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of ecosystem health evaluated based on the vital ecosystem parameters of 
ecosystem functioning. This approach determines the health of the ecosystem by comparing the 
present state of the parameter of ecosystem functioning with its delineated relative range of natural 
variability (Source: Caraher & Knapp, 1995; Hobbs & Norton, 1996).  
Where       is the present state of the parameter of ecosystem functioning  
          is the relative range of natural variability of the ecosystem  
 
However, while this ecosystem parameter approach may be considered useful, it can be criticised for two 
reasons. First, it is well known that ecosystem functions, such as nutrient retention are extraordinarily 
difficult to quantify (Burley, 1988; Noss, 1990; Nunes et al., 2003). Secondly, the restoration of ecosystem 
functioning is often best achieved through the addition of non-native species (Aronson et al., 1993; Lockwood 
& Pimm, 2001). That is, non-native species substitutions are possible, which replicate the functioning of a 
natural ecosystem. The implications of this finding would seem to be that there is no scientific basis for 
“natural” pristine systems to be considered healthier than other human-modified ecosystem states and that 
the maintenance of structure and function of an ecosystem are indeed quite distinct projects. Recently, Loucks 
(2000) has attempted to integrate structure and function together so as to measure ecosystem health according 
to the naturalness model (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The continuum of functional integrity against natural (structural) integrity 
 (Source: Loucks, 2000). 
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Despite, the measure of ecosystem health developed by Loucks (2000), one still feels uneasy about the merits 
of the naturalness model, given that non-native species can improve seemingly the health of the system. 
However, regardless of this contradiction the greatest difficulty with the naturalness model is that 
paradoxically we end up finding that nature must be actively managed and restored if it is to remain fit for 
native species, despite the insistence of the naturalness model that requires the separation of humans from 
nature (Swanson, 1995; Callicott, 1998). Accordingly, if we assume that it is right when it tends to disturb the 
biotic assembly only at natural spatial and temporal scales, and it is wrong when it tends otherwise, it would 
suggest then that intensive restoration projects are impermissible insofar as they would disturb ecosystems 
beyond natural perturbation scales (Callicott, 1996). It would seem illogical that intuitions about the positive 
value of ecosystem restoration result in objecting to the naturalness model (Fairbrother, 1998). After all, “how 
can anything be restored by human agency the essence of which is to be independent of human agency?” 
(Attfield, 1994; p. 45).  
 
It seems that the conception of naturalness is a misnomer. It is incorrect to assume as with the naturalness 
model that humans are “apart from” and not “part of” nature. Since Charles Darwin and his classic writings 
“The Origin of Species” (1857) and “The Descent of Man” (1871), we have established that humans are 
nothing more or less than a primate with some exceptional talents. We, as a society cannot afford the illusion 
that maintains that humans are separate from nature, as it denies the fundamental reality that humans 
through the intervention of development now effect to some degree all accessible ecosystems on this planet 
(Vitousek et al., 1997). Thus, it is paramount that when managing ecosystems that we acknowledge that 
anthropogenic changes of ecosystems are as “natural” as any other. We must come to terms with the fact that 
we as a society are intimately interconnected with nature, and that socio-economic systems are embedded in 
ecosystems (Kay & Regier, 2000; Limburg et al., 2002).  
 
3.0 Imperialism, reductionism and systems theory  
The shortcomings of the arcadian school and its naturalness model as a viewpoint of nature, leaves us with 
the other predominant school of thought that of imperialism, which is a viewpoint of nature based above all 
on logic and scientific analysis (Worcester, 1979). As such, the resource and functional aspects of ecosystems 
are prioritised, well above ethical or aesthetic considerations. However, within the imperial school of thought, 
an intellectual divide has separated scholars’ view of nature, which at its extremes could be considered 
reductionistic, while at the other holistic. The reductionistic view, which is the cornerstone of conventional 
scientific thinking, considers that nature can be completely described through its presumed micro-
foundations and the collection of its component parts. On the other hand, those of a more “holistic” 
persuasion insist that the essence of nature itself is best described by investigating the whole utilising the 
theories of systems thinking.  
 
Needless to say, reductionists have looked to find the fundamental “building blocks” of nature. Thus, with 
the scientific discovery of genes, cells and molecules, life scientists, have been won over that reductionism 
through molecular science represent the best means of determining the underlying truths of nature. But, by 
embracing molecular science, modern biology has all but lost any true identification with the science of the 
whole. Moreover, the incorporation of Mendelian genetics with Darwinian theories of evolution, has led 
biologists to infer that every point in space is realisable as an organism, species and ultimately an ecosystem, 
as long as the localised environmental conditions favour its expression. In other words, any kind of biological 
and ecological form is seemingly possible, within certain basic mechanical limits. As such, when these so-
called neo-Darwinists wish to speak of a healthy ecosystem, what they mean is that the conception of 
ecosystem health should be one based prominently on genetic diversity (or distinctiveness), as it is this which 
dictates the processes of natural selection, that blind, cumulative and non-directional force of nature, to 
continue, and thus ensures prolonged evolutionary potential. That is, genetic diversity ensures that 
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organisms, species and ecosystems can maintain their “biological fitness” and therefore usefulness for 
survival in their current and future environments.  
 
Despite the optimism of biologists, the presumptions of neo-Darwinism theories of evolution leaves little 
explanation for the actual generation of highly complex ecological and biological forms found in nature. In 
the neo-Darwinian view, species and ecosystems are just products of adaptation somehow brought together 
through random genetic mutations. Thus, neo-Darwinian theories seem to have trouble providing a 
convincing explanation of why “higher” species ever emerged when bacteria, a simple organism, has a high 
degree of biological “fitness” (Davies, 1987). Extraordinarily, even Darwin was concerned with the extensive 
ecological and biological form that many “higher” species have. For example, in Origin of Species (1857; p. 
172) Darwin wrote: “To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to 
different distances, for admitting different amounts of light and for the correction of spherical and chromatic 
aberration, could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely admit, absurd in the highest degree 
possible”. Moreover, with neo-Darwinism causality is neither mechanical nor deterministic, because of the 
role of random genetic mutations. Thus, neo-Darwinism seems to leave out any probable explanation for the 
intentional ecosystem development and behaviour observed in nature.  
 
The inability of neo-Darwinism and natural selection to explain appropriately the development and 
behaviour of complex biological and ecological forms found in nature, has propelled the systems perspective 
forward, which above all claims that it is impossible to understand the nature of ecosystems by only 
investigating its component parts (Simberloff, 1997). The reductionistic approaches to science, to which many 
scientists adhere, do not seem to be met with ecosystems (Costanza, 1993). Indeed, ecologists and other 
system theorists contend that a system is not characterised by weak, linear interactions between component 
parts, but instead by strong, usually non-linear interactions between all of its parts (Costanza, 1992; Kay & 
Regier, 2000). This means that is it impossible to simply sum scale behaviour to arrive at large scale results 
(von Bertalanffy, 1968; Rastetter et al., 1992). Thus, dynamic systems are considered fundamentally irreducible 
and indivisible units (Wolfgram, 1984; Bohm et al., 1997). In view of that, system analysts attempt to reveal 
properties of ecosystems by studying the systems as a whole. It is thought that by adopting a systems 
perspective of the whole, certain properties become apparent and other behaviours are made detectable that 
otherwise would be “invisible” by processes of reductionism (Ulanowicz, 1986). Clearly then, what we need is 
“to see the forest, not the trees” (Jorgensen, 1997; p. 7).  
 
3.1 The succession-to-climax model 
One systems perspective developed in ecology is the “process-functionalist” approach (Allen & Hoekstra, 
1992), which treats ecosystems, that is, organisms, species and their physical environments as “integral bio-
geo-chemical energetic systems” (Lotka, 1925). Thus, the process-functionalist approach propounds that the 
units of selection in ecosystems are cycles of energy and material flow that have different auto-catalytic 
properties (Odum, 1969; Depew & Weber, 1996). Given this perspective of the underlying mechanisms of 
ecosystems, Lotka (1925) formulated the “maximum power principle”. In essence, this principle argues that 
organisms tend to be selected by these energetic systems (ecosystems) when they are more efficient in their 
energy utilisation, and species are favoured, if they enter into cooperative interactions with other species, 
allowing the ecosystem as a whole to maximise the through flow of “useful” energy. Consequently, with the 
appropriate selection of organisms and species, the whole system is likely to increase its energy flows and 
material cycle rates (metabolism) through the system, which it is argued will increase total system biomass 
and the overall health of the ecosystem.  
 
The behaviour and development of an ecosystem of this process-functionalist approach has been modelled 
according to the theory of ecological succession, a theory which ultimately leads to a stable climax phase 
(Odum, 1969). Accordingly, the aptly named succession-to-climax model presupposes that a highly ordered 
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successional sequence of biotic communities dominated by small fast growing species referred to as r-
strategists, dynamically converge in a linear manner towards a sustained and often predictable climax 
assemblage of K-strategist species, species that are large but slow growing (Clements, 1916; Tansley, 1920; 
Odum, 1969). Interestingly, the notion of a mechanical Newtonian-like development towards a stable 
equilibrium purported in the succession-to-climax model is analogous to theories and axioms found in much 
of neoclassical economic theory (Kamien & Schwartz, 1991; Varian, 1992; Holling & Sanderson, 1996). 
Certainly, both make the assumption of relatively steady growth, with stabilising forces providing an 
“invisible hand” that guides the system along a trajectory to maintain productivity and towards a sustained 
single steady state or equilibrium. Hence, in presuming the existence of a single stable equilibrium point, the 
climax phase, the succession-to-climax model presumes implicitly the property of global stability (see Figure 
3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: (a) Graphical representation in discrete time of a dynamic linear model, as used in the 
succession-to-climax model to describe the development and behaviour of an ecosystem. (b) So-
called ball-and-cup diagram (see DeAngelis & Waterhouse, 1987) illustrating that with a linear 
model, the system (ball) converges towards a single equilibrium x1 (also the climax phase) no matter 
where the starting point.  
 
We know however, that ecological disturbances will inevitably occur, and these perturbations prevent the 
development of an ecosystem attaining its steady state. However, the succession-to-climax model presumes 
that a disturbance will only take an ecosystem back to a previous successional phase, whereby the 
development towards the climax phase continues to persist predictably again after the disturbance. Thus, 
according to the model an ecosystem will always develop towards its climax phase regardless of how far it is 
displaced from this phase after a disturbance event. As such, the health of an ecosystem according to the 
succession-to-climax model can be modelled as if it were a homeostatic system, because homeostasis assumes 
fundamentally that ecosystems exhibit a unique equilibrium, which can self-perpetuate generation after 
generation by negative feedback (Odum, 1969; Oechel et al., 1994; Kay & Regier, 2000). Importantly, a 
homeostatic system has intuitive appeal when defined in terms of ecosystem health as it interprets health in a 
similar manner to the health of humans, in that optimal ecosystem health can simply be defined as a system 
absent of “disease”, whereby “disease” is considered a disturbance to the system (Schaeffer et al., 1988; 
Anderson, 1991). Hence, for an ecosystem to retain its health the ecosystem “attempts” to eliminate the 
disease and return to its “preferred” healthy “state”, the climax phase, which is absence of “disease”. 
 
From a scientific perspective, the optimal health of the system found at the climax phase can be explained by 
two variables: potential and connectedness. The potential of the system represents the accumulated biomass 
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or ecological capital developed through successional dynamics, and is therefore greatest at the climax phase 
(Carpenter et al., 1999). The connectedness of the system determines the strength of internal connections 
between species that mediate and regulate the influences between internal processes and the external 
environment. In other words, connectedness underpins the degree of internal control that a system can exert 
over external variability (Ulanowicz, 1986; Holling & Gunderson, 2002), which again is at its greatest levels at 
the climax phase. Thus, it is not surprising that the climax phase is most likely to be made up predominantly 
of K-strategist species, which are species that have smaller specific metabolic rates compared to r-strategists 
species, which are typically found in the earlier successional phases of ecosystem development. Accordingly, 
one might postulate that these climax species seem to have been selected as they utilise energy more 
efficiently and thus, require less maintenance. One might then conclude that the K-strategist species are 
“better” adapted than are r-strategist species. Thus, as theorised the changes in the successional communities 
are made in an effort to improve the whole system’s adaptation to utilise resources more effectively. 
Interestingly, Hannon (1992; 1999) taking the climax phase of ecosystem development as the definitive goal 
function of an ecosystem, has proposed a means to measuring ecosystem health termed gross ecosystem 
product (GEP), which is based directly on the familiar measure of economic flows gross domestic product 
(GDP). These explanations of ecosystem health in the succession-to-climax model are illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A stylised diagram representing a hypothetical depiction of ecosystem development 
according to the succession-to-climax model. Boxes A, B and C indicate successional phases, which 
develop in a linear manner towards box D, the climax phase.   
 
In spite of the theoretical eloquence and clarity of the succession-to-climax model in portraying the process-
functionalist approach, it has been severely criticised as being too narrow in scope, rigid and simplistic, and 
unable to account for and explain the scientific findings of variability in successional pathways, the constant 
dynamic changes in community composition and the non-equilibrium states observed with ecosystems 
(Hunter et al., 1988). After all, the development pathway or trajectory to a climax phase is likely to require a 
much longer time horizon than the “natural” frequency of disturbance events (Kimmins, 1996). Moreover, we 
know that when interactions between species in an ecosystem are explicitly modelled, their behaviour is non-
linear, which will not produce a linear system. Indeed, it is well known that even simple non-linear difference 
equations of single species models may produce bizarre, extremely non-linear dynamics (Gleick, 1987). Thus, 
it seems that the succession-to-climax model is flawed, not only because a complete ecological recovery of an 
ecosystem to a climax phase that maintains itself again and again can never be realised (Jorgensen, 1997), but 
because the non-linearity between species is almost certainly not going to lead to a linear system of the whole. 
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Consequently, the likelihood of ecosystems developing in a linear manner, whereby the system reaches a 
deterministic and predictable single steady state with homeostatic properties is highly questionable (Holling, 
1986; Botkin, 1990; Kay, 1993; Schneider & Kay, 1994; Pahl-Wostl, 1995; Kay et al., 1997; Kay & Regier, 2000).  
 
It seems that ecosystems are best-described as “soft” systems. As such, assumptions whereby stability is 
presumed and change is explained away should in fact be altered whereby a model of ecosystem behaviour 
and development should implicitly assume change and explain stability (van der Leeuw, 2000). In other 
words, life is not in a stable equilibrium, but is dynamic and constantly changing, and as such, change cannot 
be thought of as an “error term”, or anomaly, but rather as law. It seems the definition of ecosystem health 
and the subsequent management of ecosystems must acknowledge that ecosystems are dynamic and ever-
changing entities. Therefore, a model of ecosystem development should incorporate the system’s need to meet 
the challenge of changing factors, and not attempt to model the eternal “struggle” to return to exactly the 
same ecological community. For this reason, determining the development and behaviour of ecosystems 
appropriately requires that models are based on non-linear dynamics (Budiansky, 1995; Kay & Regier, 2000).  
 
3.2 Non-linear dynamics, multiple equilibria and resilience 
The non-linear nature of ecosystem development implies that multiple equilibria exist, rather than a single 
equilibrium, as determined in the linear succession-to-climax model (see Figure 5). Accordingly, given that 
non-linear models have multiple equilibria, ecosystem states are only locally stable, and not globally stable as 
assumed in a linear model. Importantly, this phenomenon of multiple equilibria is not just a mathematical 
artefact, as the presence of multiple ecosystem states and transitions among these states has been observed 
empirically in a range of ecosystems. These include transitions from grass-dominated to woody-dominated 
semi-arid ecosystems in Zimbabwe (Walker et al., 1981) and Australia (Walker et al., 1997). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: (a) Graphical representation in discrete time of a dynamic non-linear model. The system has 
multiple equlibria demarked as x1 and x3, while x2 is an unstable state. (b) Ball-and-cup diagram of 
the same non-linear model. The cup represents a particular state of the system and the ball 
represents the current position of the system within the state.  
 
In order to model the a non-linear dynamic system maintaining a particular system state despite 
perturbations, the concept of resilience was introduced formally by Holling (1973), who described the 
resilience of an ecosystem appropriately as “ecological resilience”. Thus, ecological resilience is diametrically 
related to notions of local stability and elasticity of the system state (Ludwig et al., 1997). However, while 
ecological resilience is related to stability, Holling (1973; 1986) warns not to mistake ecological resilience for 
stability per se, as stability is relevant when an ecosystem’s state is close to its equilibrium, while ecological 
resilience is most relevant when investigating non-linear conditions far from its steady state. Thus, ecological 
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resilience is effectively about the pressure-stress-response capability of the system state, that is, the magnitude 
of disturbance a particular state can absorb without transitioning to an alternative system state (Holling, 1973; 
1986; Holling et al., 1995).  
 
While the definition of ecological resilience seems fairly clear, an alternative definition of resilience has also 
been proposed (Pimm, 1984). This form of resilience, described here as “economic resilience” propounds that 
resilience can be measured by the speed of return of a system to its steady state following a disturbance event 
(Pimm, 1984; O’Neill et al., 1986; Tilman & Downing, 1994; Ives, 1995; Neubert & Caswell, 1997). Thus, while 
ecological resilience defines resilience as the maintenance of existence of functioning, economic resilience 
defines resilience as the maintenance of efficiency of functioning (Costanza, 1992). Figure 6 depicts the 
concepts of ecological and economic resilience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: (a) Stability profile illustrating ecological resilience. Importantly, the width of the system 
state “cup” dictates the magnitude of ecological resilience. (b) Stability profile illustrating economic 
resilience. Depressions in the landscape with flatter slopes have less economic resilience than areas 
that have steeper slopes (Source: Gunderson et al., 2002). 
 
Economic resilience implicitly assumes that the system will always attempt to reach a steady state and the 
ecosystem response will be approximately proportional to the perturbation. This is of course unlikely to be so, 
given the non-linear nature of ecosystems. Thus, the use of economic resilience can only be justified in states 
where ecosystem behaviour is functioning near its steady state, and not far-from-equilibrium states. As such, 
economic resilience may be useful for investigating systems that operate in a linear fashion, or at least where a 
linear approximation is sufficiently valid (Pimm, 1991). Indeed, it could be argued that even where multiple 
equilibria are shown to exist, a linear approximation might be acceptable by way of argument that 
expectations and norms make the other equilibria unlikely. Furthermore, given that there is unlikely to be a 
general solution for non-linear relationships, many analysts have been content to investigate only the local 
stability of a particular state within a non-linear system. However, in ecosystem development, the critical 
feature is stability far from any equilibrium because it is in these areas that a system may make a transition 
into an alternative system state. Hence, only ecological resilience can be considered satisfactory.  
 
3.3 The diversity-stability model 
An implication of multiple equilibria in ecosystem state space is that no longer can we expect ecosystems to 
maintain global stability. Thus, it might be considered prudent to keep ecosystems in a stable state and to 
avoid “flips” into less stable ecosystem states. Hence, one can argue that the health of an ecosystem is 
reflected by its stability (or ecological resilience) (Batabyal, 1998; Ferriera & Towns, 2001). Needless to say, 
research for half century has focused on the long held belief that connectance (number of connections) of an 
ecosystem begets the stability of that ecosystem. That is, it has long been presumed by ecologists that the 
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greater the species diversity (a proxy measure for connectedness) present in a system, the more stable the 
system network is likely to be and the more likely the various ecosystem functions will be maintained (Folke 
et al., 1996). This diversity-stability hypothesis is the most legitimate ecological argument for preserving 
diversity within ecosystems. Importantly, in focusing on diversity, this hypothesis is grounded in the 
“population-community” approach to ecology, which focuses on organisms and species, and thus views 
ecosystems as “networks of interacting populations” (O’Neill et al., 1986; Allen & Hoekstra, 1992). However, 
the diversity-stability hypothesis, has been one of the most controversial and ongoing debates in ecology, 
whereby the relationship has been validated and rejected on numerous occasions.  
 
Pioneering research investigating the diversity-stability hypothesis by MacArthur (1955) seemed to affirm 
that ecological communities that were highly connected are more stable than simpler ones. MacArthur (1955) 
suggested that there was a direct correlation between the logarithm of the number of food links in a food web 
and the degree of stability. Elton (1958) added further weight to the argument when it was pointed out that 
the apparent extreme stability of tropical rain forests may well be because these systems are the archetypal 
diverse and connected ecosystem. The observed positive relationship between connectance and stability, 
however, initially came under attack on mathematical grounds from May (1973) and later by Goodman 
(1975). May (1973), in his study of randomly assembled model food webs, found exactly the opposite: “too 
rich a web connectance… leads to instability”. This was reasoned, because as the number of species increases, 
the probability increases that one of them will be associated with a real positive eigen value, which will hence 
act towards an unstable mode of oscillation within the system. May (1973) reconciles his arguments with the 
undisputed data of more oscillatory behaviour in simpler boreal ecosystems than in more species diverse 
tropical ones by arguing that the causation is reversed. Following the mathematical account for connectance 
leading to instability, came empirical evidence of the phenomena by Weiderholm (1980), who observed that 
increased phosphorus loading gives decreased diversity, but very stable systems.   
 
While, it might seem that diversity and connectance decrease stability, Pimm (1991) found in computer 
simulations, ecosystems with few species were easy to invade and destabilise. Indeed, ecological communities 
of up to twelve species were easily entered by intruding and destabilising species. This conclusion was soon 
supported with empirical evidence by Baskin (1994; p.203), who concluded from his findings that the “biggest 
gains in stability, for example come with the first ten species in a system; beyond ten, additional species did 
not seem to add much stability, perhaps because the essential functional niches had already been filled”. 
Interestingly, Baskin (1994) further noted that similar conclusions can be made for productivity, in that “more 
diverse systems are more productive – at least up to a point”. Despite, these conclusions of the role of 
connectivity and diversity recently, Loreau (1999) posited that diversity is able to buffer temporal variance, 
and Rozdilsky and Stone (2001), in strictly competitive systems found increased diversity can lead to 
increased stability. Thus, again one is left with much ambiguity about what determines a stable system.  
 
It seems from this ecological research that one is left to conclude that ecosystem stability is a very complex 
concept and it is likely that there is no simple relationship in which to model it. However, MacArthur (1972) 
suggests that stable systems have in fact intermediate levels of connectance. This credible proposition (as we 
will confirm later) was also taken up by O’Neill et al. (1986) who concluded that, because a system can become 
unstable either by being over or underconnected, the addition of a new component can have an effect 
opposite to what might be intuitively expected. Thus, an increase in diversity can stabilise the system, either 
by adding connected parts to an underconnected system, or removing connected parts to an overconnected 
system. Thus, the stability of ecosystems in its widest ecological sense might be best considered a 
multidimensional relationship. This diversity-stability relationship may be formulated as follows: if the 
system can offer a better survival (i.e. increasing stability in relation to the changing forces functions by 
decreasing the diversity), the system will not hesitate to react accordingly. Thus, the more diverse an 
ecosystem, does not give the best answer to stability and survival (Olmsted, 1988). Diversity is a two-edged 
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sword, and despite its ease of measurement, diversity indices such as the Shannon-Weaver index should not 
be considered a prime de facto measure for ecosystem health.  
 
But, despite MacArthur’s and O’Neill’s conclusions and the difficulties of diversity and stability as measures 
of ecosystem health there still remains the significant difficulty that much of the empirical evidence 
examining the diversity-stability hypothesis investigated population networks close to equilibrium and not 
states far-from-equlibrium. Indeed, the role of diversity over a much broader range of variations and the 
relationship between diversity and ecological resilience has only recently been addressed, and while likely to 
provide a similar relationship, this is yet to be sufficiently proven (Levin, 1995; Perrings et al., 1995; Peterson et 
al., 1998; Gunderson et al., 2002). However, when attempting to unravel an ecological relationship for 
resilience, some observers consider Walker’s (1992) driver species hypothesis credible. This hypothesis 
proposes that species can be divided into two groups, “driver” species and “passenger” species. Driver 
species are effectively “keystone species” (Paine, 1969) in that they control the resilience of the system, while 
the passenger species do little to maintain the system in a particular state. Thus, the basic premise of driver 
species hypothesis is that some species have unusual qualities in that they have much stronger non-linear 
interactions with the overall behaviour of the ecosystem network compared to the weaker interactions found 
with other species. However, despite the ease of measurement for ecosystem health (i.e. health simply 
measured by the abundance of driver or keystone species in the system state), there is little anecdotal 
evidence in the scientific literature to support the such a hypothesis (Mills et al., 1993; Bond, 2001; Wassenaar 
& Ferreira, 2002). 
 
Most empirical evidence seems to suggest that patterns present in ecosystems are for the most part entirely 
independent of the species the ecosystem contains (Naemm et al., 1994; Holling et al., 1995; Lockwood & 
Pimm, 2001). In fact, ecosystem functioning can normally be preserved even as the component species 
normally considered responsible for that particular function are lost, as other species readily fill the vacated 
niche (Tracy & Brussard, 1994). Similarly, studies of various ecosystems have also shown that the population 
dynamics of individual species are more sensitive to stress and perturbations within ecosystems than are 
ecosystem processes (Schindler, 1990; Vitousek, 1990). These findings then beg the question of how important 
any species are in an ecosystem. In theory, we could experimentally delete species one at a time, measure the 
ecosystem impacts on resilience and function, and generate a frequency distribution of species importance, 
relative to abundance. Despite this seemingly insurmountable challenge, some ecologists have tried to do just 
that, but the research remains inadequate as only a fraction of the species in an ecological community have 
been deleted (Berlow et al., 1999). An additional problem is that the importance of a species might change in 
different places or at different times (Power et al., 1996). So, a species that may be highly valuable ecologically 
in one place and at one time may or may not be important ecologically in another place or at another time.  
 
It seems that we remain uncertain as what is the underlying relationship to deciphering ecological resilience. 
Despite this difficulty, Costanza (1992; p.7) proposed that, a system state should be considered healthy “if it is 
stable and therefore sustainable; that is, if it is able to maintain its metabolic vigour, its internal organisation, 
structure and autonomy and is resilient to perturbations and stresses over a time and space frame relevant to 
the system”. In effect, Costanza suggests that to model ecosystem health we must integrate measures of 
function, structure and stability, which he did by formulating a straightforward though ad hoc multiplicative 
index of ecosystem health by incorporating potential, connectedness and ecological resilience variables 
together (see Equation 2).  
max EHI C P R≡ × ×  
Equation 2: An index of ecosystem health (Source: Adapted from Costanza, 1992; Mageau et al., 1995). 
Where EHI is the ecosystem health index 
C is the connectedness of the ecosystem 
P is the potential of the ecosystem  
R is the ecological resilience of the ecosystem  
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Regardless, of Costanza’s efforts to develop a suitable ecosystem health index, it is apparent that the various 
models representing both the “process-functionalist” and “population-community” approaches are 
insufficient and have considerable reductionistic tendencies that fail to capture the dynamics of non-linear 
systems and explore under the mist of ecosystem “complexity”. However, recently a general theory of non-
linear systems first conceptualised by von Bertalanffy (1968) has emerged from outside the scientific field of 
ecology, which seems to have finally unveiled the development and behaviour of ecosystems into just a few 
fundamental principles.  
 
4.0 Self-organisation, emergence and thermodynamics 
The new theory of development and behaviour of dynamic non-linear systems is at its core based on the 
principle of self-organisation. That is, dynamic non-linear systems, such as ecosystems tend to lead to a 
process of lower to higher levels of organisation, while being kept within limits (Schuster & Sigmund, 1980). 
Thus, self-organisation is a process that leads to the emergence of higher formed network structures (Figure 8). 
The nexus of this self-organising process is an “attractor”, whereby attractor comes from the state space 
description of the behaviour of the ecosystem. Thus, a state within a system behaves as if it were “attracted” 
toward a domain. The dynamics of a self-organising system are largely a function of internal causality and as 
such the system is dominated by non-Newtonian positive and negative feedback loops. These feedback loops 
allow the system to maintain itself about an attractor despite changes in the external environment, because the 
feedback loops of the system tend to maintain the system’s present state. Therefore, the environment may 
change substantially, without the system exhibiting major change. It is this capacity to organise and maintain 
itself about an attractor that is the fundamental hallmark of a self-organising system. As such, a self-
organising system implies a goal-like function (similar in character to the climax phase in the succession-to-
climax model), whereby internal causal mechanisms direct the ecosystem towards the state attractor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The diagram illustrates the process of self-organisation leading to emergence, where 
emergence is developed from an initial group of localised interacting agents, which leads to the 
formation of a higher network structure with global properties (Source: Schuster & Sigmund, 1980).  
 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that some academics may feel somewhat uncomfortable about 
the principles of self-organisation and emergence, because such notions may be likened to “vitalism”, the now 
defunct idea that a Platonic-like “life force” is what inhabits life and nature, and which directs an ecosystem 
along some trajectory. However, it is important to re-enforce that self-organisation is process developed 
internally within the system, and is not the product of an “external engine” as vitalists would contend. 
Emergent properties arise from local interactions among system components, and in turn they influence the 
local interactions. All evolving ecosystems possess emergent properties and appear to behave like much-like 
super-organisms (Kay & Regier, 2000). But this super-organic behaviour is the result of a continuing two-way 
feedback between local interactions and global properties. It is not the outcome of some “mystical” global 
Global properties 
Local interactions 
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property determining the local interactions of system components, nor is it solely the cumulative result of 
local interactions in the system that can be explained by reductionistic analysis. It truly is the system as a 
whole being an integrated, dynamic structure involving two-way interaction between all levels. Importantly, 
it is these notions of self-organisation and emergence that seem to explain ecological and biological form 
unexplained by the processes of natural selection alone. Accordingly, Levin (1999) postulates that the 
combination of self-organisation and natural selection seen to be the appropriate perspective to view 
evolution.  
 
At the core of ecosystems as self-organising systems is the thermodynamic conceptualisation that such 
systems are dissipative systems (Prigogine, 1980). A dissipative system is one which is subject to the second 
law of thermodynamics. That is, according to the second law, energy with a high amount of information and 
organisation always dissipates in a materially closed system. Thus, while the quantity of energy is always 
conserved as implied in the first law of thermodynamics, the quality as implied in the second law does not, 
which means that all energy transformations will involve energy of higher quality being degraded to energy 
of lower quality.  
 
It initially seems that the second law of thermodynamics would lead us to rather pessimistic conclusions of 
decay and degradation. However, we also know that decay towards thermodynamic equilibrium is it seems 
in stark contrast to the development of ecosystems, which seem to exhibit the propensity towards ever more 
higher structures with emergent global properties. But, one is left wondering how do ecosystems have this 
ability to build up and maintain increasingly complex structures, when the components of a system have an 
inherent predisposition towards disorder, decay and degradation? It would appear there is a paradox of life; 
that is, the emergence of complex structures in the face of the second law of thermodynamics.  
 
This contradiction was resolved by Schrodinger (1944), who fittingly pointed out that whereas the second law 
describes isolated or closed systems; all ecosystems have to be described as open systems, which exchange 
energy with surrounding systems and their environment. Thus, an ecosystem is not strictly a system, but 
rather a system of systems. That is, there is a hierarchical nature of systems, whereby each system is nested 
within a system and is made up of systems (Allen & Starr, 1982). Accordingly, because an ecosystem is an 
open system it can maintain a non-equilibrium state and avoid thermodynamic equilibrium by importing 
high quality energy from other surrounding systems and its external environment, whilst exporting low 
quality energy. This exchange of entropy (i.e. a measure of energy disorder, whereby high quality energy has 
low entropy) by the ecosystem allows the ecosystem’s total entropy to decrease, while inevitably increasing 
the entropy in the surrounding system’s environment. To that end, Schrodinger (1944; p.75) surmised these 
findings by expressing that “life feeds on low entropy”.   
 
In view of Schrodinger’s findings, it can be understood that self-organising dissipative processes emerge 
within open systems whenever a sufficient throughflow of high quality energy is available to support them. 
The details of these dissipative processes depend on the materials available to operate them, the energy and 
information present to catalyse the processes, and the surrounding environment. The interplay of these 
factors defines the context for the set of processes which may emerge (Jorgensen, 1997; Kay & Regier, 2000). 
Once a dissipative process emerges the open system has a high propensity to move away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium, and when the system does move it will reach a critical distance from 
equilibrium, whereby the open system responds with the spontaneous emergence of new organised 
behaviour that uses the throughflow of high quality energy to manifest and organise itself as a complex 
ecological structure. These structures provide a new context, nested within which new processes can emerge, 
which in turn beget new structures. And with more high quality energy obtained by the system, an ecosystem 
ultimately emerges. Thus, an ecosystem according to this new perspective of dynamic non-linear systems can 
be described as a nested constellation of self-organising dissipative processes and structures organised about 
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a particular set of sources of high quality energy, materials and information, embedded in the environment 
(Kay & Regier, 2000).  
 
Once ecosystem structure is established, ecosystem growth is provided by high quality energy being stored in 
the formation of ordered structures of biomass. In thermodynamic terminology, this growth builds up further 
organisation and structure, and continues to allow the system to move against the gradient imparted by the 
second law of thermodynamics. Importantly, it seems that if the system is offered more than one pathway to 
move away from equilibrium, the organisation yielding the most growth or stored high quality energy will be 
selected (Jorgensen, 1997). However, for ecosystems and its species to continue to grow they must adapt and 
specialise to their surrounding environment, which is achieved by storing more information into the system. 
This process of diversification, adaptation and specialisation in turn increases the emergent structure, while 
allowing the system to be more efficient at utilising the system’s resources so as to be more effective at 
building more structure and more “fitted” to the prevailing environmental conditions, which thus further 
enhances the dissipating capability of the ecosystem. (This transformation towards greater diversification and 
specialisation in nature can be explained in much the same way as Adam Smith’s (1776) famous pin-making 
example, whereby tasks are sub-divided so as to increase returns to production). Importantly, this 
development towards increasing structure, through diversification, adaptation and specialisation almost 
seems to be a natural law of self-organising systems, akin to the second law of thermodynamics, though 
unlike the second law, this law acts in the reverse direction to energy degradation (Jorgensen, 1997; Kay & 
Regier, 2000; Puu, 2000).  
 
A mature ecosystem is then with the increase in adaptation and specialisation of its species to its 
environment, a very complex highly interconnected structure. Moreover, it contains a very high concentration 
of biomass and contains much information in a wide variety of species. However, at this mature stage, most 
of the high quality energy captured by the ecosystem goes into maintaining its structure and only a very small 
amount into further growth. The growth of biomass finally stops when one of the essential building blocks for 
growth becomes scarce (Jorgensen, 1997). It seems that “all aspects of life are ultimately governed by the 
scarcity of resources” (Hirschleifer, 1982; p. 52). (Interestingly, one might then speculate that the development 
of human cognition has evolved so as to utilise resources more efficiently). Thus, in conclusion ecosystem 
development proceeds in a way that: one, captures resources (high quality energy and material); two, makes 
more effective use of resources; three, builds more structure; and four, enhances survivability (Schneider & 
Kay, 1994; Kay & Regier, 2000).  
 
4.1 The emergy, exergy and ascendancy models 
In an effort to gain some consensus on an operational measure and characterisation of ecosystem health, while 
acknowledging ecosystems as complex self-organising systems there it would seem is a need to make an 
assumption of how we perceive an ecosystem conducts itself as if it has an internal “objective function”. One 
thermodynamic objective function proposed is that ecosystems organise themselves to maximise the 
degradation of the available work in incoming energy (Kay, 1991). This goal of ecosystems has been captured 
by the notion of emergy (Odum, 1996), which expresses the amount of energy it costs to build an ecosystem 
and is measured utilising energy flows, much like Hannon’s (1992; 1999) novel GEP measure. An alternative 
thermodynamic objective function is that ecosystems attempt to maximise their storage of energy. This goal 
function can be measured by the notion of exergy, which is a measure of the amount of high quality energy 
(or information) stored in an ecosystem structure. The biological and ecological meaning of this objective can 
be related to Darwin’s “survival of the fittest”, that is, survival means growth, which is equal to increased 
high quality energy of the system relative to the environment (Jorgensen, 1997). The organisation that is able 
to produce the highest exergy under prevailing conditions will be selected.  
 
  16 
Clearly, then the difference between the emergy and exergy models, is that while the former focuses on how 
much energy it costs to create the ecosystem structure, the latter considers to account for the ability of the 
ecosystem to do work. Importantly, the same ecosystem can have quite different emergy and exergy values, 
because for example, some environments will require a greater amount of energy to produce similar 
structures of biomass. Jorgensen (1997) suggests that exergy is a more appropriate objective function of 
ecosystem development because while maximum degradation of energy is a consequence of the development 
of ecosystems from the early to the mature state, it is not necessarily an appropriate objective function for 
mature ecosystems, as ecosystems cannot degrade more energy than that corresponding to the incoming solar 
radiation. Interestingly, exergy as a measure of ecosystem health is similar to the “entropy theory of value” 
conceived by thermodynamic scientist and economist Georgescu-Roegen (1971), where value is considered in 
part determined by the level of entropy for that object investigated. However, like Georgescu-Roegen, 
Jorgensen (1997) warns that while exergy capture and storage is a fundamental “objective” of ecosystem 
development it does not suggest that other factors should be neglected in demarcating ecosystem health. This 
sentiment is wise as while a measure of exergy has sound theoretical grounding, it is not only extraordinarily 
difficult to quantify and measure, it neglects both emergent network properties associated with dynamic non-
linear systems and the need to incorporate a variable for determining the resilience properties of the system.  
 
A network perspective of non-equilibrium systems has also been established in the traditions of the diversity-
stability model, which does capture emergent network properties through modelling ecosystem behaviour by 
information and network theories. One promising though again somewhat impractical measure of these 
theories is the “ascendancy” index (Ulanowicz, 1980; 1986; Wulff et al., 1989). The ascendancy index and 
measures like it go several steps beyond species diversity indices used in ecology, because they estimate not 
only how many different species there are in a system but, more importantly, how those species are organised 
collectively in the ecosystem. Thus, a rise in the index of ascendancy represents an increase in system size and 
organisation, which translates a measure of growth and development, and thus survival. However, network 
approaches, such as the ascendancy index are almost entirely used to investigate systems near steady state. 
One can conclude that to truly represent and model the principles of self-organisation and emergent global 
structures, both thermodynamic (energetic) and network measures of ecosystem health (i.e. ascendancy and 
exergy) must be integrated, as in fact they are complementary perspectives and measures on how an 
ecosystem develops and behaves (Nielsen & Ulanowicz, 2000). But, the development of this pluralistic 
viewpoint of so-called “thermodynamic networks” requires more research in hierarchy theory and as such is 
still very much in its infancy (Jorgensen, 1997; Kay et al., 2001).  
 
4.2 Order, chaos and complexity  
The fundamental dynamics of non-linear systems has revealed that away from equilibrium the nature of these 
systems are surprisingly rich and complex, whereby non-equilibrium conditions are a source of organisation 
and therefore order. In general, a system near thermodynamic equilibrium, being stable, can accommodate 
fluctuations from the mean state. When forced to move away from equilibrium by externally applied 
gradients, a critical point may be reached where the fluctuations can no longer be accommodated and instead 
are amplified to produce a new macroscopic order, described as “complexity”, the “edge of chaos”. The 
process involves an instability being triggered by fluctuations that exceed some threshold, and the system 
then reorganises itself to accommodate the instability. Thus, Schneider and Kay (1995; p.232) write: 
 
Life emerges because thermodynamics mandates order from disorder whenever sufficient 
thermodynamic gradients and environmental conditions exist. But, if life is to continue, the same 
rules require that it be able to regenerate, that is create order from order. Life cannot exist without 
both processes, order from disorder to generate life and order from order to ensure the continuance 
of life. 
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But, as expressed by Ulanowicz (1997) there is a “window of vitality” to this macroscopic order of complexity, 
that is, there is a minimum and maximum level in between which self-organisation can occur and emergence 
is maintained. Too much or too little of each of these opposing forces (i.e. internal and external forces) create 
an imbalance which will upset the efficiency of the system. Thus, the point where the disorganising forces of 
the environment and the organising forces of the ecosystem are balanced, an optimum operating point is 
established (Kay, 1984; Kay, 1991). Indeed, if a far-from-equilibrium system such as a highly inter-connected 
mature ecosystem becomes isolated, and severed from its energy sources, then it will decay towards 
thermodynamic equilibrium by irreversible processes (Ulanowicz, 1997). Thus, there is a range within which 
self-organisation and emergence occurs, and as such complex self-organising systems do not strive for a 
maximum (as would implied in measuring emergy or exergy), but rather an optimum. Therefore, in 
accordance with findings of diversity-stability relationship, ecosystem development should be modelled as if 
it has an effective lower and upper limit.  
  
To grasp this macro-state of complexity consider a set of species as components of an ecosystem. The specific 
macro-state of the system will be determined by the degree of connections that bind the species of the system 
together. Now presume that all possible states imaginable can be arranged along an axis. Effectively, this axis 
(see Figure 9) defines state space (Kauffman, 1993), that is, state space is the set of all possible system states 
that can be constructed from the given set of species available. At the ends of this axis, lie the two extremes: 
the null set of states, or states of order, which have no or few connections; and the complete set, or states of 
chaos, which have a high number of connections (or a complete set of connections). The adjacency structure of 
state space then distinguishes all possible n-systems.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The axis of state space. Importantly, only states within the “states of complexity” are able to 
produce emergent self-organising systems.  
 
Importantly, in states of order, coherence and stability of information is maximised, but experimental 
arrangements of that structure are minimised. In chaotic states the opposite applies, such that it effects a 
massive search of the possibilities within state space, but is unable to lock onto any that are “useful”. 
Complexity and the states that lie within it, on the other hand, could be considered an inference of the effect 
that a balance between stasis (states of order) and change (states of chaos) is the ultimate principle underlying 
all time evolutionary and self-organising processes. Thus, while equilibrium is the expression of “balance” in 
a linear “economic” world, complexity is the expression of “balance” in a dynamic non-linear “real” world 
(Potts, 2000).  
 
Importantly, when we consider the non-linear relationships that exist in ecosystems, we might well wonder 
why chaotic states are not observed more often. The obvious answer is that nature attempts to avoid chaos, so 
that it can continue to self-organise and evolve. Naturally then, the health of an ecosystem should be 
determined above all by the ability an ecosystem has in maintaining its “integrity” for continued self-
organisation (Kay, 1991; Muller, 1998; Kay & Regier, 2000). Importantly, it is this definition of ecosystem 
health that is sometimes referred to as “ecosystem integrity” and thus, fundamentally different conceptually 
to ecosystem health (e.g. Karr, 1996). However, here we consider ecosystem integrity as simply another 
interpretation of the ecosystem health concept.  
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4.3 The adaptive cycle model 
It was Holling (1986) who first developed a means to model specifically ecosystem development, with the 
principles of emergence, complexity, evolution and the integrity of self-organisation being intuitively 
incorporated. The representative model coined the adaptive cycle is structured by a sequence of four phases 
that occur within a system state. The first two phases of the model are similar in conception to the predictable 
and certain nature found with the succession-to-climax model. The first phase named the exploitation or r-
phase begins with the ecosystem exploiting those ecosystem processes that are responsible for rapid 
colonisation of disturbed ecosystems during which developmental r-strategist species capture easily 
accessible resources. The second phase, described as the conservation phase occurs when the slow resource 
accumulation builds and stores increasingly complex structures, whereby K-strategist species predominate, 
hence this phase is also described as the K-phase of the cycle. Ecological capital consisting of biomass and 
physical structure increases during the long periods of the slow dynamic sequence from exploitation to 
conservation (r to K), while at the same time the system state becomes more and more tightly bound with 
existing species. Thus, the ecosystem’s connectedness increases to a point, eventually becoming too rigid and 
over-connected (Holling, 1986; 2001).   
 
At a certain point, the tightly-bound accumulation of ecological capital becomes too fragile through the 
ecosystem being “overconnected”. The actual change from the K-phase to the third phase, “release” or the Ω-
phase is triggered by agents of disturbance. The disturbance suddenly releases the resources accumulated and 
sequestered as ecological capital and the tight organisation is lost. Importantly, the Ω-phase is sometimes 
referred to as “creative destruction”, which is a term originated by the economist Schumpeter (1954; 1964), to 
explain alterations in the economy between periods of renewal and periods more conducive with the 
predictability modelled in economies following a strictly neo-classical trajectory (r to K). Finally, the process 
of change resultant from the Ω-phase creates opportunity for the fourth phase, reorganisation (α-phase), 
where released ecological capital is mobilised to become available for the next r-phase.  
 
In contrast, to the r to K stage, the Ω to α stage contains considerable uncertainty. At that stage, the previously 
accumulated mutations and capital can become reassorted into novel combinations, some of which nucleate 
new opportunity and where new species can evolve. Importantly, once the system reaches the α-phase, if the 
system still retains sufficient amounts of its previous components it can reorganise to remain within the same 
state as before. However, if the reorganisation process in the α-phase does not retain sufficient amounts of 
previous components it may make a transition into an alternative system state x. Thus, it is as if two separate 
“objectives” are functioning, not simultaneously but instead in sequence (Holling & Gunderson, 2002). The r 
to K stage maximises production and accumulation; then the Ω to α stage maximises invention and 
reassortment. Figure 10 illustrates a stylised representation of the four phases of the adaptive cycle illustrated 
within the two dimensions, potential and connectedness.  
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Figure 10: Stylised representation of Holling’s adaptive cycle illustrating the four phases of 
ecosystem development (r, K, Ω, α) and the dynamics between these phases. The arrows indicate the 
speed of the development in the adaptive cycle, where short arrows indicate slow change and long 
arrows indicate fast change. The above adaptive cycle diagram is plotted against two ecosystem 
variables: 1. Y axis, is the potential of the system, which represents the ecological capital the system 
accumulates as well as unexpressed random genetic mutations (ecosystem innovations); 2. X axis, is 
the degree of connectedness (Source: Holling, 1986; Holling & Gunderson, 2002). 
 
Figure 11 adds the third dimension, ecological resilience to the adaptive cycle. This orientation of the figure 
illustrates to us that as the phases of the adaptive cycle develop; the ecological resilience of the system 
expands and contracts. The conditions that occasionally foster novelty and experiment occur during periods 
in the back loop of the cycle, when connectedness is low and resilience is high (that is, during the α-phase). 
The low connectedness permits novel reassortments of elements that were previously tightly connected to 
others in isolated sets of interactions. Interestingly, there is a hypothesis, as yet unproven, that the slow 
variables (those with the largest inertia or r-to-K phase), rather than the fast variables, are responsible for the 
resilience properties of an ecosystem (Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Ecological resilience is another dimension of the adaptive cycle and is added to the two 
dimensional diagram shown in Figure 10 (Source: Holling & Gunderson, 2002).   
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An important implication of the adaptive cycle model and the integrity of self-organisation in general, is that 
because of nature’s cyclic and self-organising behaviour one cannot identify a goal function of ecosystem 
development. Hence, there is no phase or specific assemblage of species within a system state that is 
ecologically more important than another. As such, we cannot assume that certain species (e.g. 
driver/keystone species, K-strategist species or mature species) within a particular system state are 
ecologically better. Ecosystem health demarcated by the integrity of self-organisation and modelled by the 
adaptive cycle model puts species in effect on an ecologically “equal” pedestal. However, this notion of 
species equality should not be confused with the diversity-stability model, as the adaptive cycle model does 
not propound that diverse systems are ecologically “better” either.   
 
Thus, while an impoverished system state, which has its health eradicated through mismanagement, may 
have low connectedness, low potential and low resilience (a position within a state referred to as a “poverty 
trap”, though ironically such a system is unlikely to remain trapped for a long period, as the low resilience 
means it is highly susceptible to state space transitions), a system with a high connectedness, high potential 
and high resilience (see Costanza’s index of ecosystem health p.12) may be equally maladapted. Indeed, a 
system with high connectedness, high potential and high resilience is effectively constrained within a 
“frozen” or “locked” state, described by Holling and Gunderson (2002) as a “rigidity trap”, which not only 
prevents the system state from self-organisation, but again suggests such a system within a state is intuitively 
ecologically better, yet we know this is not the case. In fact, such a system if it ever came in to being would be 
highly brittle, and would require substantial resources to keep it maintained. Indeed, forcing systems through 
management to persist within existing structures may seem to avoid “problems” that occur with change. 
However, the longer the system is “locked” into a particular community the greater its vulnerability and the 
more “devastating” the collapse of the system state will be perceived to be. That is, interrupting the adaptive 
cycle through intensive management not only interferes with the “normal” cycle of life, but also amplifies the 
magnitude of change within a system so much that it may shift violently into an alternative system state 
(Holling et al., 1995).  
 
4.4 Catastrophes, bifurcations and uncertainty 
We know that despite ecosystems being able to maintain their present system states that change in a system 
state is inevitable. Indeed, beyond a critical threshold value, which is poised at the edge of chaos (Kauffman, 
1993), the organisational capacity of a system is overwhelmed and the behaviour of the system becomes 
highly unstable, whereby the system state inevitably leaves its present domain of self-organisation and 
attraction. At this point the system may make a transition or “flip” from one attractor to another. Importantly, 
these shifts are not a gradual, smooth and continuous passage between system states, but rather rapid, 
catastrophic and step-wise (Perrings & Pearce, 1994). Indeed, the notion of self-organised criticality seems to 
explain why some processes lead to a minor event, while at other times the same processes lead to major 
catastrophes (Bak, 1996). To see this, an appealing analogy is that of a sand pile, representing if you will the 
development of an ecosystem. Imagine that a thin stream of sand is being run onto a round plate. Obviously, 
over time a sand pile steadily develops, soon reaching the edge of the plate. The initially low pile of sand soon 
gets higher and higher, until suddenly more sand may trigger a small sand slide, and then say a big one, that 
is too say the same magnitude of disturbance (another grain of sand) may lead to a response of all size ranges. 
Thus, the sand pile, when it can take no additional sand before sand slides will continuously occur, represents 
an ecosystem poised at this critical threshold.  
 
The actual change to another basin of attraction, that is, a new state of an ecosystem, is most often modelled 
by either catastrophe theory or bifurcation theory. Catastrophe theory was originally developed by the 
mathematician Thom (1975) and explains state transitions in a way that a system trajectory along a smooth 
surface will at certain points have combinations of impossibility, which correspond to “folds” in the surface 
mapping. Thus, a system approaching one of these “folds” must make a jump, in so doing the system faces 
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what Thom identifies as a catastrophe. Nonetheless, despite the usefulness of catastrophe theory it has scope 
limitations, and consequently bifurcation theory is considered the most applicable theory for modelling state 
transitions. The general approach of bifurcation theory is to construct bifurcations, that is, critical points 
whereby the trajectory of a system is divided into new possible pathways, so as to explain the state dynamics 
of a system (see Figure 12). Generally, there will be successive bifurcations as the system moves further from 
equilibrium, each associated with a distinct system configuration.  
  
 
 
Figure 12: A typical diagram illustrating bifurcation theory. 
Where b1, b2 and b3 represent bifurcation points 
 
There is however, an element of irreducible uncertainty about what new trajectory (or state) after the 
bifurcation will be selected prior to the actual selection occurring. This uncertainty intrinsically limits the 
capacity to predict categorically how a situation will unfold, say after changes in the management of an 
ecosystem (Costanza & Cornwell, 1992; Ludwig et al., 1993; Kay & Regier, 2000; Limburg et al., 2002). Thus, 
while the “time evolution” of an ecosystem is governed by somewhat deterministic and predictable laws 
between bifurcations (Levins, 1999), the behaviour at a bifurcation has elements of historical happenstance, 
which is largely unpredictable and cannot be reduced to probabilistic estimates, no matter how much 
information we have and how sophisticated our simulations might be. In other words, in the vicinity of a 
bifurcation, fluctuations with a chance-like character play a dominant role in determining the future state of 
the system. The reason for this chance-like character is because beyond a bifurcation a system may adopt 
more than one new state. Thus, changes in the system cannot be tied categorically to any specific 
environmental changes.   
 
In consequence of bifurcation theory, it seems that the Laplacian aspiration to be able to quantitatively 
predict, with certainty, how the future will unfold, is irreconcilable with modelling of complex self-organising 
systems (Kay & Regier, 2000). What is certain, however, is that before the state attractor is ever reached, the 
state conditions, determined by the external factors and the internal ecosystem components, will have 
changed and a new attractor is then effective. And before this new state attractor can ever be reached, new 
external and internal conditions will again emerge, and so the process goes on (Jorgensen, 1997).  
 
5.0 The subjective social utility model  
From the work presented hitherto on models of ecosystem health the following conclusions can be delineated. 
First, the credibility of the naturalness model is dubious, as there are numerous philosophical and pragmatic 
difficulties in implementing naturalness, not least because humans and therefore human action that alter 
“natural” systems should in themselves be considered “natural”. Secondly, the conventional approach to the 
scientific process that of reductionism,  effectively propounds that ecosystem health can be determined by 
genetic diversity, however, this approach wrongly assumes that nature and ecosystems are mechanistic, 
Steady state 
trajectory Chaos 
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which can be easily broken down into its component parts. Thirdly, the classical systems approach of 
succession-to-climax is also unconvincing as a model of ecosystem health, as it wrongly insinuates that 
ecosystems develop in a linear manner towards a self-perpetuating single steady state, rather than assuming 
the presence of multiple equilibria and non-linear dynamics. And fourthly, there is little empirical evidence 
that supports the diversity-stability and keystone species hypotheses, thus, ascertaining health of an 
ecosystem by its diversity or abundance of an exceptional species is unfounded. These conclusions 
demonstrate that when demarcating ecosystem health we must avoid commonly held hypotheses like: 
naturalness is “good”, diversity is “good”, extinction of species is “bad”, stability and resilience is “good”, 
and change is inherently “bad”. Indeed, the most pervasive misappropriation when demarcating a concept 
such as ecosystem health is the insertion of subjectivity and values under the supposed objective guise of 
scientific research (Kapustka & Landis 1998; Lackey, 2001).  
 
In addition, to relinquishing these habitual beliefs as to what is “good” ecologically, we must as concluded 
previously accept that there is no ecologically “better” assemblage of species within a system state. 
Furthermore, and even more critically we also must conclude that there is no ecologically “better” state within 
an entire ecosystem. Moreover, we also can conclude that there is no reason to believe that evolution is 
inherently “good” either. Indeed, the philosopher Moore (1903) like Kuhn (1962), have reasoned that there is 
no evidence that nature necessarily evolves toward “good”. To be “better” does not necessarily mean to be 
more evolved; to be more evolved does not necessarily mean to be “better”. Consequently, categorical 
statements about an ecologically “good” state or community for a given system cannot be deduced from 
“objective” scientific arguments. Science cannot resolve which community, state or basin of attraction is best. 
A value-free desire for a strictly scientific demarcation of ecosystem health, which can be applied irrespective 
of circumstances, cannot be satisfied at present (Regier, 1993; Kay & Regier, 2000). As such, if strictly scientific 
demarcations of ecosystem health cannot be satisfied, then it would seem that the most appropriate means to 
characterising the concept is through a set of criteria which reflect the subjective values of society. For that 
reason, we must treat the health of an ecosystem not as a “positive” concept, but as a “normative” concept, 
because ultimately society has to decide what state is considered “good” (Costanza, 1992; Sagoff, 1995). 
Science can only provide information, so as to inform about the management tradeoffs each state may 
represent.   
 
Naturally, this logical though somewhat controversial conclusion may lead scientists to dismiss the concept of 
ecosystem health altogether. In truth, many scientists believe that the utilisation of value-based definitions for 
interpreting the phenomena of nature, while useful in general conversation may be hopelessly difficult to 
quantify (Ryder, 1990; Lancaster, 2000). It would seem that some members of the scientific community remain 
steadfast in preserving definitions of ecosystem health to those empirically “observed” in nature. While such 
stands plague the progress of demarcating ecosystem health, it is understandable as a scientist’s learning 
instils an unwillingness to tarnish analysis with subjective values, as this would serve only to dilute the 
“objectivity” of science and potentially lead to nature being the grotesque result of human invention, 
imagination and fantasy (Kapustka & Landis, 1998; Lackey, 2001). Indeed, scientists may dread that given that 
most individuals of society prefer on the face of it industrialisation to “nature”, that nature as we conceive of 
it may be reduced to “rubble”. But, as a society when making value-laden decisions in a free market and 
democratic environment, we must accept the values of society whatever they maybe. Indeed, to suggest that 
some of the societal satisfactions that nature brings are morally superior to others only reflects certain biases 
(Callicott, 1992; 1998). We must as certain axioms of economic theory propound, treat all societal values and 
preferences concerning resource use as morally equivalent and thus, decisions made concerning resource use 
should be determined solely in a market environment (Randall, 1988).  
 
Since we can and “must” actively manage nature to maintain and preserve it (Swanson, 1995), and since there 
is no scientific basis for demarcating ecosystem health, the possibility of managing nature for objectives that 
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benefit society directly come into thinking. Indeed, we can conclude that humans may not only co-exist with 
healthy ecosystems, but that they may alter them so as to improve upon them (Regier, 1993). Even, Leopold 
(1939b; p.294) an unfaltering conservationist all his life could envision these ideals when he prophetically 
stated; “when land does well for its owner, and the owner does well by his land; when both end up better by 
reason of their partnership, we have conservation. When one or the other grows poorer, we do not”. 
Importantly, one can assume that Leopold is not suggesting that nature has actually been improved upon by 
industrialisation in the past, but rather that societal values and preferences made within a utility framework 
might actually improve upon nature as well as society in the future. One then can suppose that the economic 
questions of supply and demand (and costs and benefits) are what truly matters. That is, “what kind of 
ecological garden do we as a society want?” And, “what kind of ecological garden can we as a society get?”  
 
In taking this economic approach we also know it is not the ecosystems as “things-in-themselves” that have 
“end-value” to society, rather it is a multi-attribute bundle of various ecosystem goods and services (see Table 
1) that ecosystems supply to society that have value (or more appropriately utility) to society (Lancaster, 1971; 
Lockwood, 1996; Hoehn et al., 2003). Thus, when demarcating ecosystem health by the aggregation of utility, 
it is important to grasp that this is not suggesting that managing an ecosystem is the same as managing a firm 
producing a multiple array of products. Indeed, the producers of a firm almost certainly have much better 
information of their products that they can satisfactorily produce. In contrast, we are likely to underestimate 
the goods and services provided by ecosystems, because of the inherent uncertainty involved in ecosystem 
development and behaviour (Hoehn et al., 2003). Moreover, while it might be argued that if it is some 
ecological service the ecosystem performs that is considered important to society, then a “factory” (i.e. firm) 
might suffice that can produce the same service as supplied by the ecosystem (that is, it might be possible 
simply to substitute ecological capital for human-made capital) (Sagoff, 1995). But, this deduction neglects 
that in order for an ecosystem to function they must be treated as a whole. In essence, any weighting and 
aggregating of values into a social utility function must also reflect ecosystems in their entirety. As such, a 
social utility function is useful only in distinguishing amongst states, but not ecological communities within a 
state, as the integrity of the process of self-organisation and evolution within a state must be maintained.  
 
Goods & services Ecosystem functions  Examples 
Genetic resources Sources of unique and ever-evolving genetic 
information  
Genes for pathogen resistance, technology for breeding 
Other raw 
materials 
That portion of gross primary production extractable 
as raw materials 
The production of timber, fuel, and fodder 
Climate regulation  Regulation of global temperature and precipitation 
at global or local levels 
Greenhouse gas regulation, DMS production affecting 
cloud formation 
Gas regulation  Regulation of atmospheric chemical composition The carbon dioxide-oxygen balance and ozone levels for 
UVB protection 
Water regulation  Regulation of hydrological flows Provisioning of water for industrial processes or 
transportation 
Pollination  Movement of floral gametes Provisioning of pollinators for the reproduction of plant 
populations 
Biological control Trophic-dynamic regulations of populations Predator control of prey species 
Regulation of 
human diseases 
Ecosystems can change the abundance of human 
pathogens 
Cholera and abundance of mosquitoes can be altered 
Waste treatment Recovery of mobile nutrients and removal or 
breakdown of excess nutrients and compounds 
Waste treatment, pollution control, detoxification 
Recreation  Providing opportunities for recreational activities Eco-tourism, hunting and other recreational activities 
Heritage Providing opportunities for non-commercial uses Historical, aesthetic and educational values 
Table 1: The bundle of value-laden goods and services (attributes) provided by ecosystems that 
society might value (Source: Constanza et al., 1997; p.254; Curtis, 2004; p. 164). 
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In spite of the apparent ease with which a social utility function might demarcate ecosystem health, for many 
economists the idea of a social utility function is in itself problematical. Indeed, it is well-known in social 
welfare theory that it is unworkable to obtain a “true” social preference as outlined in Arrow’s (1951) 
Impossibility Theorem. However, this obstacle can be overcome if one considers the concept of utility defined 
by marginal classical economists as opposed to utility defined by present-day neoclassical economists (Cooter 
& Rappoport, 1984). In particular, the classical economist Pareto (1897) distinguished between “utility” and 
“ophelimity”, whereby utility was considered directly comparable across individuals in a cardinal sense and 
thus “objective”, whilst ophelimity refers to ordinal preferences that are therefore entirely subjective and as 
such are not comparable amongst individuals. To illustrate the contrast between these value forms, Pareto 
(1896) suggested that bad-tasting medicine has utility for sick people, but not ophelimity. Thus, the difference 
between utility and ophelimity is the difference between being socially “useful” and individually “desired”. 
As such, at the level of individual for socially useful things is construed as being those things conducive to 
human health. Accordingly, those goods and services that fall clearly into the category, can include the 
bundle of attributes provided by ecosystems would then constitute the components of cardinal utility and not 
the ordinally derived ophelimity.   
 
A simple theoretical framework with a high level of abstraction of the social utility model is developed. The 
framework begins by assuming that society wants to maximise its “utility” (and therefore ecosystem health) 
from ecosystem management subject to certain budgetary constraints. That is, the ecosystem manager wants 
to maximise utility for society per dollar spent of public funds. Now suppose we were to consider n 
ecosystem goods and services according to those outlined in Table 1, which are then measured as scores xi, for 
i = 1,…n. Accordingly, each ecosystem in its present state (or phase) would represent a Lancasterian bundle of 
performance scores, and thus each ecosystem state j could be represented as a vector of values aij for i = 1,…m. 
Society would then, by acquiring a collection of quantities qj of the ecosystems, obtain a combined 
representation of the performance dimensions. Suppose there are in all m different potential ecosystems, 
which present a collection or portfolio of ecosystems from which society can derive utility from. Accordingly, 
given budgetary constraints it will sometimes be optimal to disinvest in one ecosystem and invest into 
another, “that is, it will be socially optimal to engage in conversions between assets to equilibriate returns…” 
(Swanson, 1994; p.805). Thus, if we put this all formally, the overall performance of the collection or portfolio 
of ecosystems would first be written according to Equation 3:  
 
1
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=
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Equation 3: Performance of the collection of ecosystems. 
 
Now suppose that utility for each system state is known and that society wishes to maximise utility according 
to the following social utility function in Equation 4 subject to Equation 3 and Equation 5:  
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Equation 4: Social utility function.  
Where W is the present value of future flows of utility 
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Equation 5: Budgetary constraint.  
Where pj denote the prices rendered for ecosystem management 
C denotes a given fixed budget allocated by society to ecosystem management.  
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If we now had prices for the xi variables we could go ahead with analysis, doing things such as evaluating 
different portfolios and choosing among them. The xi variables would be included in the social utility 
functions and so establish demand for various ecosystems. 
 
5.1 Change, foresight and adaptation  
Marshall (1949; p.xii) once stated that “the Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in 
economic dynamics… But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics”. These words 
remain prophetic, as while we have defined a simplistic theoretical description of an optimal ecosystem 
management strategy through maximising social utility, we have only found the most desirable and efficient 
states of a portfolio of ecosystems at a point in time. However, as we are now well aware fluctuations and 
change within and between system states are inevitable, which in turn, will alter society’s supply of 
ecosystem goods and services (utility). Thus, with complex self-organising systems that “change”, one should 
not be focusing on efficiency at a point in time, but rather efficiency at future points in time. In other words, 
“change” cannot be modelled appropriately by being ecologically well-adapted to the conditions of the given 
environment and by means of optimal resource allocation, instead, “change” is best modelled as the ability 
the system has in adapting to possible changes in the environment (Potts, 2000). However, despite these 
problems with fluctuations, fluctuations within a state, which reflect “boom” (r to K) and “bust” (K to Ω) 
patterns in the adaptive cycle maybe intuitively smoothed. This is reasoned because informed humans 
through the use of foresight, anticipation and intentionality may be able to reduce the “boom” and “bust” 
nature of the adaptive cycle, by transmitting future scarcities into current prices (Solow, 1973).  
 
Nonetheless, fluctuations resulting in state transitions must be considered differently, in that no matter how 
well informed and far-sighted an ecosystem manager might be there is no means to predicting which state 
configuration might eventuate after a catastrophic event. Nevertheless, as an ecosystem moves further away 
from the neighbourhood of its stable equilibrium, the relevant value concepts of importance shift from 
focusing on further utility generation to one of utility maximisation and uncertainty, because (presumably) 
the K-phase provides the most utility to society, but has the least ecological resilience (Ludwig et al., 2002). 
Importantly, the uncertainty of a desired system state can be determined or modelled in one sense or another, 
by the state’s ecological resilience. That is, resilience R acts in much the same way as a probabilistic function 
does when determining expected utility and thus, Rj is the ecological resilience for the present system state j 
expressed as a probability, while 1 – Rj is the probability of a state transition of j.  
 
Accordingly, it has been argued that a means to ensuring that a desirable state (or phase) is maintained is to 
enhance the ecological resilience of the system state, while decreasing the resilience of less desirable states 
(Walker et al., 2002). However, this approach to ecosystem health is problematic for two reasons. First, 
because altering resilience will affect the ability of the system to properly self-organise and may lead to 
unwanted “lock-in”. And secondly, because we must not assume that societal values and preferences are 
fixed and given, but also can change (at quite possibly a faster rate of change) as well. In other words, a 
desirable state with “enhanced” resilience at time t may become decidedly undesirable soon after at time t+1. 
Yet, not only is it difficult to destabilise the once desired system into an alternative more desirable state, but 
there can be no assurances that this now desired state will then eventuate. As a result, the management of 
system states by altering their resilience for state change or adhering to a risk-averse “safe minimum 
standard” is not seen as effective.  
 
It seems given the limitations imposed by complex self-organising systems, management strategies for 
ecosystems must focus on maintaining the capacity to adapt to ever-changing ecological conditions (Reid, 
1994). That is, we must truly accept chance and not relegate such phenomena through some grossly simplified 
“error term” (Mirowski, 1989). As such, we must accept the fact that the more we adapt ourselves to a given 
environment, the less we are suited to changed circumstances. And the more we prepare for all possible 
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contingences, the less we have devoted ourselves to the present environment. Accordingly, how should we as 
a society decide the balance between the known present and the set of all possible and imaginary states and 
futures, when the future states remain uncertain? This is one of the fundamental problems that make up the 
foundations of economics (Potts, 2000). One strategy that seems to fit this problem is adaptive management, 
which is based in the ideologies of co-evolutionary development (Holling, 1978; Gunderson et al., 1995). In 
adaptive management, differences between how the future actually unfolds and how it was envisioned are 
seen as opportunities for learning. Thus, the aim of adaptive management is to address the inherent 
uncertainty found in ecosystem development and behaviour by achieving management objectives while 
simultaneously gaining knowledge and continually updating societal values (Walters, 1986). In other words, 
the only appropriate means to proceed in an environment that is so uncertain is not to predict what the future 
holds, or to resist future system changes, but to experiment and to react to changes as they become apparent 
(Lempert et al., 1996). This is the same way nature itself achieves “balance”, that is, through maintaining and 
self-organising itself in states of complexity.  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
It might have been thought that ecosystem health, an ecological concept could be demarcated by ecological 
means, but this seems not to be so. By demystifying ecosystem health it was concluded that the concept is 
fundamentally “normative” and can be determined by economic means alone. But, while the concept may be 
best modelled by an economic paradigm through a social utility function, it must be done so in a way that 
also captures the intrinsic ever-changing dynamics that are quintessential to a complex, self-organising 
system.  
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